UNICEF Used by US to Bribe CountriesIt should come as no surprise but Harvard University Researchers reveal that the US bribes nations on the UN Security Council to vote its way. What is even worse is that the US uses UNICEF funds to do the bribing.
Recent revelations by Harvard University Researchers that the US bribes nations on the UN Security Council to vote its way should come as no surprise. What is even worse is that the US disgustingly uses UNICEF funds to do some of the bribing.
An article in Sunday’s edition of UK paper The Observer suggests that “in a detailed analysis of 50 years of data, Harvard University’s Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker provide the clearest evidence yet that money is used by the council’s richest member to grease the wheels of diplomacy.”
“The US uses its aid budget to bribe those countries which have a vote in the United Nations security council, giving them 59 per cent more cash in years when they have a seat, according to research by economists,” The Observer’s economics correspondent Heather Stewart writes.
Excerpts from report published in October’s Journal of Political Economy:
Using country-level panel data, we find a large positive effect of Security Council membership on foreign aid receipts. On average, a non-permanent member of the council enjoys a 59 percent increase in total aid from the United States and an 8 percent increase in total development aid from the United Nations. Further results lend strong support to the bribery hypothesis over the two alternative hypotheses mentioned above. First, we find that aid to Security Council members is significantly larger during key diplomatic years—that is, years in which the United Nations receives an especially large amount of media coverage, or in which a major international event occurs. The variation used to identify this effect is plausibly exogenous; it is driven by the fact that some countries serve on the Security Council during relatively calm years while others, by chance, are fortunate enough to serve during a year in which a key resolution is debated and their vote becomes more valuable.
Second, aid payments sharply increase in the year that a country is elected to the Security Council, remain high throughout the two-year term, and return to their earlier level almost immediately upon completion of the term. The sharp increase challenges the notion that the correlation is being driven by an unobserved, secular change in a country’s international influence or diplomatic savoir-faire. Similarly, the rapid return to baseline aid levels after a country has completed its tenure suggests that the aid is not due to a newfound awareness of the country’s needs. Instead, the discontinuous pattern of aid suggests that Security Council countries experience a windfall of aid only during the period when they enjoy increased influence in the United Nations.
Read the full report on TruthForAChange.info at http://www.truthforachange.info/library/uscorruption.pdf